I. Introduction
First used by then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Stanley Surrey in 1967, 1 the concept of tax expenditures refers to aspects of tax legislation that are designed not to implement the specific tax itself, but instead to encourage various social and economic activities by reducing the amount of tax otherwise payable by taxpayers who engage in these activities. Observing that these tax incentives are functionally equivalent to government spending programs, Surrey argued that the U.S.
federal income tax actually consists of two parts:
one part comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax on individual and corporate net income; the second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which Governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct Government expenditures.
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While most tax expenditure literature has tended to focus on the income tax, not consumption taxes, 3 the same distinction could also be drawn for broad-based consumption taxes, such as retail sales taxes or value-added taxes. 4 For more narrowly based excise taxes, on the other hand, Surrey suggested that tax expenditures could not exist.
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Although the mere identification of a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure need not necessarily imply a normative judgment regarding its merits, in practice tax expenditure analysis has typically been critical of tax expenditures for two general reasons. First, on the grounds that they are generally unlimited in duration, without any budgetary ceiling, subject to limited legislative oversight, administered by the revenue authority rather than the government department that would otherwise be responsible for a direct spending program, 6 and poorly targeted to the kinds of marginal decisions that they are intended to affect, 7 tax expenditures are often criticized as a wasteful form of government spending. 8 Second, on the basis that they increase the complexity of the tax system, 9 distort economic decisions and necessitate higher tax rates to compensate for foregone revenues, 10 and provide "upside-down" subsidies when delivered in the form of deductions or exemptions within a progressive income tax, 11 tax expenditures are also criticized as a questionable approach to tax policy -violating traditional tax policy principles of simplicity, efficiency and equity. 7 Ibid. at 719-20, suggesting that "tax incentives are wasteful because some of the tax benefits go to taxpayers for activities which they would have performed without the benefits." While the same criticism may also be levied against government subsidies as a whole, it is often argued that direct expenditures can be more easily targeted to the kinds of marginal activities that the subsidy is intended to stimulate. 8 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 32-37. 9 Ibid. at 26, emphasizing that "[t]ax simplification will be impossible if these tax expenditures persist." 10 Surrey, "Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy" supra note 6 at 725-26. 11 Ibid. at 720-25, acknowledging (at 723), however, that a tax incentive delivered through a refundable flat rate credit would not be subject to this criticism. 12 Surrey and McDaniel, supra note 4 at 25-27 and 69-98.
Consequently, as the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation explains in a recent
review of tax expenditure analysis, Surrey intended that the concept would serve two normative purposes. 13 First, by subjecting tax expenditures to the same kind of legislative scrutiny that is traditionally accorded to direct spending programs, Surrey hoped that the concept would lead to greater control over government spending. 14 Second, by identifying various so-called "tax provisions" as spending programs, Surrey also hoped that the concept would promote effective tax reform, as policymakers would recognize that these provisions violated basic tax policy principles of equity, efficiency, and administrative simplicity.
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In the years since Surrey formulated the notion of a tax expenditure, the concept has had mixed success as a stimulus to legislative reform. While U.S. and Canadian governments have produced regular tax expenditure reports in order to enhance the visibility and potential legislative scrutiny of these measures, 16 the number of tax expenditures in the U.S. income tax has actually increased over the last 35 years, 17 though it is impossible to confirm a similar trend from Canadian reports. 18 As an impetus to legislative reform, therefore, one might be tempted to conclude that tax expenditure analysis has been an abject failure. At the same time, however, tax expenditure analysis has had a considerable effect on the design of tax expenditures, as these are increasingly delivered in the form of credits rather than deductions or exemptions, 19 are often temporary in nature, 20 and are occasionally subject to budgetary ceilings. 21 As a result, while tax expenditure analysis may not have reduced the number of tax expenditures, it appears to have had considerable influence on tax policy and tax reform, 22 and may yet have some influence on public spending as a result of legislative sunsets and budgetary ceilings.
This paper examines a particular category of tax expenditures in Canada, namely tax expenditures that are designed to limit the growth of carbon emissions that contribute to global warming. Unlike the U.S., which relies heavily on tax expenditures as instruments of energy and climate change policy, 23 Canada has introduced very few such tax expenditures, relying instead on voluntary initiatives, direct subsidies, and limited regulatory measures to limit carbon emissions. 24 As background to this inquiry, Part II 
III. Identification
The first task of any tax expenditure analysis necessarily involves the identification of a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure, rather than an inherent element of the relevant tax. Although this initial task might seem relatively straightforward, it has provoked fierce debate about the appropriate standard or benchmark against which a tax expenditure is defined and caused some commentators to question the relevance of tax expenditure analysis altogether.
In Stanley Surrey's view, the concept of a tax expenditure was necessarily premised on a normative tax base, which he equated with the Haig-Simons-Schantz comprehensive income concept in the case of income tax expenditures, 45 and a broadbased concept of consumption in the case of retail sales taxes and value-added taxes.
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For this reason, he also concluded that it was impossible to identify tax expenditures within narrowly-based excise taxes. Committee suggests that tax expenditure analysis should be limited to a more narrowly targeted category of "tax subsidies", 58 which it defines as specific tax provisions that are "deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law (not a hypothetical 'normal' tax)" and that collect less revenue than the general rule. 59 In addition to its virtue as a more neutral benchmark for tax expenditure analysis, this definition is more easily applied not only to broad-based consumption taxes like retail sales taxes and value-added taxes, but also to more narrowly targeted excise taxes which might also include embedded tax subsidies.
With this conceptual introduction, it is now possible to identify the key tax expenditures that federal and provincial governments in Canada have introduced in order to limit the growth of carbon emissions. For this purpose, we employ the more neutral concept of tax subsidies suggested by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, reviewing tax measures that deliberately depart from an identifiable general rule within the particular and collect less revenue than the general rule.
55 Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 35-38. 56 Ibid. at 36. 57 Seymour Fiekowsky, "The Relation of Tax Expenditures to the Distribution of the 'Fiscal Burden'" (1980), 2 Canadian Taxation 211, suggesting that a concept of "tax subsidy programs" be defined by reference to general tax rules from which they depart, as well as their ability to be replaced by direct expenditure programs. For similar approaches, suggesting that the concept of a tax expenditure be defined in terms of its potential replacement by a direct spending program, see Michael J. McIntyre, "A Solution to the Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure" (1980), 14 U.C. Davis Law Review 78; and Thuronyi, supra note 20. 58 Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 13 at 9-11 and 39-42. 59 Ibid. at 39.
Federal Income Tax Expenditures
In addition to these direct spending programs, the Canadian Government has also relied on tax measures to encourage energy conservation and the development of clean and renewable energy as well as the use of public transit. This section examines each of these tax measures.
(1) Accelerated Depreciation
Like many tax systems, the Canadian income tax does not permit the immediate deduction of capital expenses, 60 but allows for the deduction of these capital costs through a statutory capital cost allowance (CCA) regime. 61 While the rates at which various capital assets can be depreciated for tax purposes are generally designed to reflect the useful life of these assets, higher rates are sometimes established in order to create a special tax incentive to encourage investments in specific classes of property since their costs can be deducted over a shorter period of time. As these accelerated depreciation rates are deliberately more generous than general rules for computing CCA and are deliberately designed to encourage specific kinds of investments, they are readily characterized as tax expenditures under the approach adopted here. Indeed, the 2008
Federal Budget affirms that accelerated CCA is "an explicit exception to the general practice of setting CCA rates based on the useful life of assets" and "provides a financial benefit by deferring taxation." 89 See ITR, s. 1219(1) which specifies various kinds of start-up costs (e.g., service connection costs, costs to construct temporary access roads, costs of clearing land, and costs of engineering studies) that qualify as Canadian renewable and conservation expenses, and ibid., s. 1219(2) which specifically excludes other costs such as the cost of land, the cost of inventory, and deductible costs incurred in respect of the administration or management of the taxpayer's business. 90 See subsection 66.1(3) of the federal Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 (5 th Supp.), c. 1 (as amended) [hereafter ITA], which generally allows a deduction up to the amount of the taxpayer's "cumulative Canadian exploration expense". See also the definition of "cumulative Canadian exploration expense" in ITA subsection 66.1(6) which includes "the total of all Canadian exploration expenses made or incurred by the taxpayer before that time" and the definition of "Canadian exploration expense" in ITA subsection 66.6(6) which includes Canadian renewable and conservation expenses incurred by the taxpayer. 91 ITA, subsections 66(12.6) to (12.75). See also the definition of a "principal business corporation" in ITA subsection 66(15) which includes corporations the principal business of which is the generation of energy using Class 43.1 property, or the development of projects for which it is reasonable to expect that at least 50 percent of the capital cost of depreciable property used in each project would be Class 43.1 property. 92 retroactive to expenses incurred after December 5, 1996. 95 For the purpose of these rules, a test wind turbine was initially defined as "the first such device installed at the taxpayer's site for a proposed wind energy conversion system" provided that "the primary purpose of the device is to test the level of energy production at the site." 96 After representations by the wind energy industry, 97 the federal government announced on July 26, 2002 that it would amend the definition of a test wind turbine to allow more than one turbine at each site to qualify as a test wind turbine provided that other criteria were satisfied. 98 As ultimately adopted, the amended Regulations generally allow for more than one test wind turbine for each wind farm project provided that: (1) the wind energy produced by these test wind turbines does not exceed 20 percent of the nameplate capacity of the wind farm; (2) the project does not share with any other project a point of interconnection to an electrical energy transmission or distribution system; (3) the primary purpose of the turbine is to test the level of wind energy produced by the turbine at the place of installation; (4) no other turbine is installed within 1,500 metres of the turbine; and (5) no other wind energy conversion system is installed within 1,500 metres of the turbine until the level of electrical energy produced by the turbine has been tested for at least 120 calendar days. 99 According to a regulatory impact statement accompanying the amended Regulation, "these amendments are expected to encourage the development of a domestic wind energy sector." 100 According to the 1997 Budget, the cost of this and other environmental tax expenditures announced in the Budget were estimated at $25 million for each of the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 fiscal years.
(3) Tax Credit for Transit Passes
A third federal tax expenditure to limit carbon emissions was introduced in 2006
in the form of a tax credit for the cost of public transit passes. 102 According to this provision, individuals may in computing their federal tax payable deduct a specified percentage of the cost of "eligible transit passes" and "eligible electronic payment cards"
which are attributable to the use of a public commuter transit service purchased during the taxation year. 103 For the purpose of this provision, the term "eligible transit pass" is defined to require an unlimited right of travel for 28 consecutive days or 5 consecutive days and 20 out of 28 days, while an "eligible electronic payment card" requires at least 32 one-way trips during an uninterrupted period of 31 days. 104 The specified percentage is defined as the lowest marginal tax rate for individuals, 105 which is currently 15 percent, meaning that individuals may obtain a 15 percent reduction in the net cost of eligible transit passes and electronic payment cards. Since the credit is non-refundable, however, taxpayers whose incomes are too low to pay any tax after taking into account other credits, obtain no benefit from the credit. 106 Since commuting expenses are generally not recognized for income tax purposes in Canada, 107 this provision represents a deliberate departure from the general income tax rules and qualifies as a tax expenditure under the approach adopted here. According to the federal Government, the goals of the tax credit are "to make transit more affordable, reduce traffic congestion and lower greenhouse gas emissions." 108 
Provincial Income Tax Expenditures
Under various tax collection agreements between the federal and provincial governments, the federal government has agreed to collect provincial income tax for In contrast to federal tax expenditures that affect the definition of taxable income, federal tax expenditures that are delivered in the form of tax credits are not automatically adopted at the provincial level since the tax collection agreements allow provincial governments to determine their own tax credits. As a result, it is up to provincial governments to decide whether to adopt a tax credit for transit passes like federal tax credit. To date, only the Yukon Territory has introduced a similar tax credit, 112 though Nova Scotia announced that it would also introduce a tax credit for transit passes but deferred the introduction of this credit in its 2009 Budget. 113 In Quebec, on the other hand, the 2006 Budget announced a separate tax incentive for employer-provided transit passes, whereby employees would be exempt from tax on reimbursements of transit passes and employer-provided transit passes, and employers would receive an additional deduction equal to 100 percent of otherwise deductible amounts paid to reimburse employees for transit passes or for employer-provided transit passes. 114 In British Columbia, where PST is levied at a rate of 7 percent, the province reduces this tax by 50 percent up to a maximum of $10,000 on purchases of hydrogen fuel cell buses and alternative fuel buses, and up to a maximum of $5,000 on alternative fuel shuttle buses. 121 The Province also reduces PST on fuel efficient vehicles by $1,000, $1,500 or $2,000, depending on the vehicle type and fuel efficiency, 122 and by 100 percent of PST payable on hybrid electric vehicles up to a maximum reduction of $2,000. 123 In addition, the Social Service Tax Act exempts from the provincial sales tax "prescribed tangible personal property used for the conservation of energy. and aerodynamic and anti-idling devices. 133 Given British Columbia's decision to harmonize its provincial sales tax with the federal GST, it appears as though these sales tax expenditures will terminate at that time. 134 In contrast to British Columbia, Ontario has opted for a rebate system for provincial sales tax, offering rebates of its 8 percent PST for purchases of: residential solar energy systems; residential systems to generate electricity or heat from wind, microhydro electricity or geothermal energy; alternative fuel vehicles, powered by propane, electricity or alternative fuels, and hybrid-electric vehicles; and various Energy Star®® qualified household appliances that are purchased, rented, or leased between July 20, 2007 and August 31, 2009. 135 Although Ontario has also decided to harmonize its sales tax with the federal GST, there does not appear to be any reason why it cannot continue to rebate its share of Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) on goods and services that help to reduce carbon emissions.
Like Ontario, Saskatchewan introduced a rebate system for energy efficient household appliances subject to its 5 percent provincial sales tax in October 2003. In
April 2005, however, the provincial Government converted this rebate system into a point-of-sale exemption. 136 As Saskatchewan has no immediate plans to harmonize its provincial sales tax with the federal GST, this tax expenditure (unlike those in the B.C.
sales tax) is not facing immanent termination.
Excise Tax Expenditures
In addition to income and sales tax expenditures, federal and provincial governments in Canada have also introduced specific excise tax expenditures in order to encourage the consumption and production of renewable transport fuels. In 1992, for example, the federal Government exempted the ethanol portion of blended gasoline from the federal excise tax, which applies at a rate of $0.10 per litre on unleaded gasoline and $.0.04 per litre on diesel. 137 In 2003, the biodiesel portion of blended diesel was similarly exempted. 138 Similarly, in British Columbia, which levies a separate motor fuel tax at Although Stanley Surrey argued that tax expenditure analysis was inappropriate for excise taxes on the grounds that they are "inherently limited in scope" and "involve no normative tax provisions", 145 these exemptions from the normal tax rate applicable to transport fuels are easily characterized as tax expenditures under the alternative approach recommended by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation and adopted here. 146 Indeed, their basic purpose as tax subsidies is confirmed by recent developments in Canada, as the federal Government and several provinces have recently repealed these tax exemptions and replaced them with direct subsidies to producers of renewable gasoline and diesel alternatives in order to prevent so-called "subsidy leakage" to non-resident producers.
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Although British Columbia continues to exempt ethanol and biodiesel from the provincial motor fuel tax, similar tax exemptions in Manitoba, Ontario, and at the federal level have been replaced with direct subsidies to producers.
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IV. Evaluation
Having identified a particular tax provision as a tax expenditure, the next step in tax expenditure analysis involves an evaluation of the provision as a government policy instrument. As explained in the introduction, tax expenditures are frequently criticized as bad spending policy and bad tax policy -bad spending policy to the extent that they are unlimited in duration, lack a budgetary ceiling, subject to little legislative oversight, administered by a revenue authority that has little expertise in the specific area addressed by the tax expenditure, and poorly targeted; and bad tax policy on the ground that they increase the complexity of the tax system, distort economic decisions, necessitate higher tax rates to compensate for foregone revenues, and provide upside-down subsidies when delivered in the form of deductions or exemptions.
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Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, several commentators have defended tax expenditures as potentially attractive policy alternatives, so long as they are 147 
Subsidies to Limit Carbon Emissions
Beginning with the justification for government subsidies to limit carbon emissions, an initial objection to any such subsidy is that it contradicts the "polluter pays principle" which requires those who cause environmental damage to bear the costs of this damage. 153 To the extent that carbon emissions constitute a negative externality that imposes social costs on current and future generations, one might reasonably expect that the most appropriate policy response to this market failure would involve government regulation to limit carbon emissions or taxation requiring those generating carbon emissions to face the full costs of the environmental damage that these emissions cause. 154 From this perspective, it follows, government subsidies to limit carbon emissions are a step in the wrong direction, allowing those who are directly responsible for carbon emissions to shift the cost of reducing these emissions to society as a whole.
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Although these arguments have considerable merit, there are several reasons why governments might justifiably subsidize at least some activities that help limit and reduce carbon emissions. First, to the extent that specific activities generate public benefits in addition to those enjoyed by the persons engaging in the activities, economic analysis suggests that a subsidy may be appropriate to encourage an efficient quantity of these activities with positive externalities. 156 For this reason, governments often subsidize research and development of new products and processes, the benefits from which are 153 See , e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection, (Paris: OECD, 1989) at 27 ("the polluter should bear the cost of measures to reduce pollution decided upon by public authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state"). 154 See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 335-57 (discussing the respective merits of regulatory cap-and-trade regimes and carbon taxes as policy instruments to establish a market price for carbon emissions). 155 See, e.g., Milne, supra note 21. 156 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 150 at 105-08. often enjoyed by third parties as well as whose engaging in the research and development. For the same reason, governments might also reasonably subsidize both research and development aimed at reducing carbon emissions as well as forms of production and consumption leading to a reduced carbon footprint. 157 Similarly, to the extent that subsidies increase both the supply of and the demand for new products and technologies, they can foster dynamic efficiencies that lessen the costs of these products and technologies as markets expand and mature.
158 Second, government subsidies to limit carbon emissions can serve an informational and educational function, heightening awareness about low-carbon activities and products and encouraging behavioural changes that contribute to reductions in carbon emissions. 159 Although governments and non-governmental organizations may also encourage emissions reductions through information campaigns and product ratings, subsidies can function as tangible signals that reinforce these environmental messages.
As a result, it is not surprising that governments routinely subsidize the purchases of appliances and automobiles that satisfy standards of energy efficiency.
Third, to the extent that governments have subsidized or currently subsidize activities that contribute to the emission of carbon dioxide, such as road transportation or the production of oil and gas, 160 subsidies for low-carbon alternatives such as public transportation and renewable energy may be necessary to counteract other market distortions so that low carbon alternatives can compete fairly. Although elimination of subsidies for high-carbon activities would contribute greatly to this policy goal, the continuing legacy of earlier subsidies might well require compensatory measures to create a genuinely level playing field.
A fourth rationale for government subsidies to limit carbon emissions questions the extent to which the traditional polluter pays principle should apply in the context of climate change policy. On the contrary, to the extent that the environmental consequences of increasing carbon emissions over the last 200 years is a regrettable and unintended consequence of economic development during this period, 161 it follows that the costs of minimizing carbon emissions at this point in time should be shared widely among those who will benefit from reduced emissions, rather than imposed solely on those whose actions contribute most to current emission levels. For this reason, while taxes and regulatory measures may be essential policy measures to encourage reductions in carbon emissions, government subsidies to ease the transition to a low-carbon economy may be essential to the overall fairness of government policy in this area.
Finally, as a practical matter, it may be politically difficult for a government to successfully introduce the kinds of regulatory and tax measures that are apt to encourage significant reductions in carbon emissions. 162 For this reason as well, therefore, subsidies may be one of the few politically feasible methods to encourage emissions reductions.
Tax-Delivered Subsidies
Even if it is possible to justify government subsidies to limit carbon emissions, it
does not follow that these should be delivered through the tax system in the form of tax 161 Duff, supra note 159 at 2070. 162 See the discussion of President Clinton's failed energy tax in Janet Milne, "Carbon Taxes expenditures rather than as direct grants. On the contrary, given the traditional criticisms of tax expenditures as bad spending policy and bad tax policy, 163 one might reasonably presume that government subsidies should generally be delivered through direct spending programs rather than tax expenditures.
Notwithstanding this general presumption, however, tax expenditures may be a less costly way to deliver government subsidies than direct spending programs to the extent that they employ an established mechanism for allocating economic resources and for communicating information about government policy. 164 Rules for accelerated depreciation and expensing of capital costs, for example, are based on well-established tax rules for recognizing the cost of capital assets in computing income, and can be delivered with little additional administrative cost except that associated with the classification of qualifying assets for the purposes of these tax expenditures. Similarly, sales and excise tax expenditures to encourage emissions reductions utilize wellestablished government policy instrument that can be employed with little additional administrative cost to modify relative prices and communicate information about lowcarbon products and fuels. Although administration of the federal government's transit pass tax credit likely involves greater administrative costs on the part of the government and certainly involves increased compliance costs on the part of individual taxpayers, even it takes advantage of an established system of allocating government costs and benefits. As a result, it is impossible to reject any of these tax expenditures without considering their actual design. 163 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 164 See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 150 at 1010-12.
Tax Expenditure Design
Turning to the design of Canadian tax expenditures to limit carbon emissions, however, there are several reasons to question these measures. Beginning with accelerated capital cost allowance and special tax treatment for CRCEs, the first objection is that these measures take the form of deductions in computing net income rather than refundable tax credits, thereby favouring large and profitable taxpayers that can make immediate use of these measures. 165 While the ability to flow-through CRCEs to investors is designed to alleviate limitations on the deductibility of these expenses, these rules merely permit an upside-down subsidy to be shifted to the investor level and contain a further bias to the extent that the ability to flow-through expenses is limited to corporations whose principal business is either the generation of energy using qualifying depreciable property or the development of projects for which it is reasonable to expect that at least 50 percent of the capital cost of depreciable property is for qualifying depreciable property.
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In addition to this objection, it is also worth noting that these tax expenditures do not attempt distinguish between investments that might have been undertaken without these incentives and investments that are stimulated by these incentives, thereby increasing the likelihood that they provide windfall benefits to taxpayers who would have undertaken these investments regardless of the incentive. Although it may be practically difficult to design a tax expenditure to incorporate such a distinction, one possibility might be limit these tax expenditures to additional investments above a base amount established by the taxpayer's investments in previous taxation years. 167 As well, it is particularly objectionable that Canadian tax expenditure reports consistently fail to clearly account for these tax expenditures, reporting the cost of all accelerated depreciation (not only for investments in renewable energy and energy conservation equipment) as "not available" despite some estimates of projected foregone revenue in Federal Budgets, and failing to distinguish flow-though share treatment for
CRCEs from other flow through arrangements.
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Finally, there is very little evidence that accelerated depreciation and other tax measures to allow for the immediate expensing or flow-through of qualifying expenditures has had much effect on the rate of investment in renewable energy or energy conservation, which appears to have been driven more by measures such as renewable portfolio standards and feed-in-tariffs that increase the demand for these investments than it has by measures reducing the cost of these investments. 169 Indeed, the federal Government itself recognizes the uncertain effectiveness of these measures to encourage renewable energy and energy conservation, acknowledging in a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying amendments to the scope of Class 43.1 property in 2000 that:
The benefits of the Canadian renewable and conservation expense and Class 43.1 Regulations are difficult to quantify. To the extent that the measures encourage development of a successful domestic renewable energy and energy conservation sector, significant environmental benefits will accrue in the form of reduced greenhouse gas emissions and reduced reliance on fossil fuels. Tangible economic benefits of renewable energy are many years away, given that this industry is still in the development stage.
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As a result, one might reasonably question the merits of accelerated depreciation and flow-through rules as ways to encourage renewable energy and energy conservation.
Turning to tax expenditures for transit passes, the traditional criticism about upside-down subsidies may also be levied against the non-taxation of employer-provided or reimbursed transit passes in Quebec as well as the additional deduction for employerprovided or reimbursed transit passes. 171 As well, although it might be argued that employer control over access to these tax expenditures might help target the incentive to employees who would not otherwise use public transit, it is also likely that employers and employees will obtain a windfall simply by shifting from taxable to non-taxable compensation in the form of tax-free and double-deductible transit passes without significantly shifting employee behaviour. Like accelerated depreciation, therefore, this tax expenditure is poorly targeted to influence behaviour at the margin. The same criticism may also be directed at the federal transit tax credit, which does not depend on any measure of increased ridership, and is therefore apt to provide a windfall to transit riders who would have purchased passes without the tax expenditure. Moreover, although this tax expenditure is delivered in the form of a tax credit, the credit is not refundable, as payable after deducting other credits against which the transit tax credit may be offset.
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A final deficiency involves the compliance burden on taxpayers, who must maintain receipts for qualifying transit passes purchased during the year and claim the credit well after these passes have been purchased in filing their tax returns for the relevant taxation year. For this reason as well, therefore, one might reasonably question the merits of the federal transit tax credit.
Finally, Canadian sales and excise tax expenditures to limit the growth of carbon emissions may also be criticized on the grounds that they have been subject to little legislative scrutiny, are not well targeted to affect marginal behaviour, and are of uncertain effectiveness. As provincial governments in Canada do not produce regular tax expenditure reports, there is no ongoing accounting of these tax expenditures in order to assess their costs in terms of foregone revenue against their expected benefits. Nor is it apparent that reduced sales or excise taxes on energy efficient appliances or renewable fuels actually encourage enough additional consumption to justify the revenue losses attributable to these tax expenditures, as consumers may simply obtain a windfall for purchases that they would have made in any event. Nor is it clear that increased purchases of energy-efficient appliances and biofuels necessarily reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, as consumers may use energy-efficient appliances (like dishwashers) more frequently, and there is increasing evidence that subsidies to the consumption of biofuels is a costly and environmentally questionable way to reduce carbon emissions.
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As a result, although Canadian sales and excise tax expenditures may be relatively simple to administer and comply with and cannot be criticized on the grounds that they provide upside-down subsidies, they are vulnerable to the criticism that they represent bad spending policy.
V. Conclusion
This paper has endeavoured to identify and evaluate the most significant tax While this paper does not reject the use of tax expenditures as a policy instrument to limit the growth of carbon emissions out of hand, it has serious reservations about the merits of current federal and provincial tax expenditures for this purpose. If Canadian governments are to continue to utilize tax expenditures to help fight climate change, they should pay closer attention to the insights of tax expenditure analysis and design these policy instruments accordingly.
